Sample data
This is a real whack.sh report — rendered from example data. The layout, fields and PDF are exactly what a scan produces. The target, redirect chain, addresses and file hash are fabricated and use RFC 2606 reserved names, so this makes no claim about any real site.
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Shared scan report · #e3b0c44298fc · 2026-08-14 00:00 UTC · 9 credits

http://example.com/invoice/download?id=8f21c4

Malware 96/100
📋 Summary

Malware — a file was delivered to two of three vantages (96/100).

The datacenter vantage was served an empty 404 and nothing else. The residential and mobile vantages, requesting the same URL at the same time, were redirected through two further domains and handed a Windows executable. The file was captured from both.

A scanner checking this URL from a datacenter address alone would record it as dead. The delivery only happens for traffic that looks like a real consumer connection, which is what the target is filtering for.

Evidence SHA-256 9f2c1a7e4d6b8035ca1f47e290b6d3517c8ae04f2b91d6835e7a0c4f18d29b6e
3
Egress vantages
2
Max redirects
3
Unique hosts
7
Requests · 2.8 MB
2.1s
Load time
2
Payloads
⑂ Cross-egress divergence — vantages landed on different destinations: datacenter → example.com · residential → cdn.example.org · mobile → cdn.example.org. This is the cloaking tell a single-vantage scanner can't see.

ℹ Origin IP / ASN are shown as observed on the wire wherever an un-proxied vantage saw the host. When every vantage is proxied, the IP is resolved from DNS by the scanner node and labelled as such — a resolution can differ from what the vantage actually reached, so we never present it as an observation. Where neither is available the hop shows “— via proxy”.

datacenter done 1 hop · 404 412 B · 6.1s render · 1s queued
Exit IP: 198.51.100.24 · US · AS64500 Example Hosting LLC ✓ verified
screenshot (datacenter)
404 example.com · text/html · 104.20.23.154
residential done 3 hops · 302 › 302 › 200 1.4 MB · 10.5s render · 1s queued
Exit IP: 192.0.2.145 · US · AS64501 Example Broadband ✓ verified
screenshot (residential)
200 cdn.example.org · application/x-msdownload · 203.0.113.199

Proxied egress — a proxy can’t reveal origin IPs on the wire. IPs here come from an un-proxied vantage that observed the host, or (when every vantage was proxied) from the node’s own DNS resolution, marked resolved. Hops with neither show “—”.

#StHostIP · PTRASN · Org · CCAnonTLS
1 302 example.com 104.20.23.154
2 302 www.example.net 203.0.113.71
3 200 cdn.example.org 203.0.113.199

No TLS — served over HTTP, or certificate not captured.

⚠ captured payload payload · PE/EXE · 1.4MB 4b1d9c07e2afd35180f6ba2ce9471d8a5c30e7f24b96a8d1e05c7f3924ab61d0 MalwareBazaar ↗ Search VT ↗ retained server-side · not distributed
mobile done 3 hops · 302 › 302 › 200 1.4 MB · 8s render · 2s queued
Exit IP: 192.0.2.201 · US · AS64502 Example Mobile Network ✓ verified
screenshot (mobile)
200 cdn.example.org · application/x-msdownload · 203.0.113.199

Proxied egress — a proxy can’t reveal origin IPs on the wire. IPs here come from an un-proxied vantage that observed the host, or (when every vantage was proxied) from the node’s own DNS resolution, marked resolved. Hops with neither show “—”.

#StHostIP · PTRASN · Org · CCAnonTLS
1 302 example.com 172.66.147.243
2 302 www.example.net 203.0.113.71
3 200 cdn.example.org 203.0.113.199

No TLS — served over HTTP, or certificate not captured.

⚠ captured payload payload · PE/EXE · 1.4MB 4b1d9c07e2afd35180f6ba2ce9471d8a5c30e7f24b96a8d1e05c7f3924ab61d0 MalwareBazaar ↗ Search VT ↗ retained server-side · not distributed